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Abstract
This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion.
I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from
a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type,
the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from
a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account
the signaling potential of the sender’s choice.
1 Introduction
Some recent information transmission models (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Rayo and Segal,
2010) view the sender as an information structure designer. This view emphasizes a connection
between design and information transmission. It departs from traditional models of information
transmission (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Spence, 1973) since
it assumes that the sender commits to an information system before learning her type so that
her choice is by itself uninformative. By contrast, there is a small but active tradition in
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mechanism design (Myerson, 1983; Maskin and Tirole, 1990, 1992; Mylovanov and Troeger,
2012) that considers the possibility that a choice of mechanism by an informed principal may
be used as a signal by the participants in the mechanism. Through the study of an example,
this short paper proposes a modest first step towards building a theory of information structure
design by an informed principal.
I work in a simple framework where a sender, whose type is either high or low, seeks
validation from a receiver who wants to validate high types exclusively. The sender chooses
an information system, i.e. a conditional distribution of signals for each of her types, from a
feasible set. I allow for potential restrictions on the set of feasible information systems, which
is important to make Bayesian persuasion models more flexible. I consider perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the game in which the sender chooses an information system after learning her
type, and the receiver chooses whether to validate after observing the signal generated by the
information system. I show that there is no loss of generality in considering only pooling
equilibria by an argument partly reminiscent of the inscrutability principle of Myerson (1983).1
In general, perfect Bayesian equilibrium has little predictive power and it is unsatisfying to stop
the analysis at this point. My main result is to show that three different refinement concepts
lead to the selection of the high type optimal equilibria. The first refinement is a version of the
notion of undefeated equilibria (Mailath et al., 1993; Umbhauer, 1994) which was developed in
the context of signaling games. The second refinement is an adaptation of the notion of core
mechanism of Myerson (1983), developed for the analysis of informed principal problems, to
my framework. Finally, the third refinement builds on a discussion in Farrell (1993) to define
a refinement notion that is stronger than the related notions of neologism proofness in Farrell
(1993) and perfect sequential equilibrium in Grossman and Perry (1986). I also characterize
selection by the D1 refinement (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987). I then analyze
the prediction of this method for several common restrictions on feasible information systems.
All results are proved in the appendix.
1When all information systems are feasible, Myerson’s argument that any information revealed by the strategy
of the designer can be replicated by pooling on a different information system holds. When this set is restricted,
however, the focus on pooling equilibria relies on the particular structure of the model which implies that the
low type always wants to pool with the high type.
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The idea of this paper is inspired from Perez-Richet and Prady (2012), which shares a similar
structure, and where the information system is actually chosen by the receiver in a restricted
set, but effectively controlled by the sender insofar as she can choose a complexity parameter
that determines the cost of information systems for the receiver. This complexity parameter
can then be used as a signal about the type of the receiver. A few other papers analyze the
signaling effect of a choice of information transmission technology. In Gill and Sgroi (2012), a
monopolist chooses the toughness (a one dimensional parameter) of a pass or fail test for her
product, and analyzes the signaling effect of this choice.2 As in this paper and Perez-Richet and
Prady (2012), all equilibria are pooling, and they select undefeated equilibria. In Miyamoto
(2013), the information of the sender is two-dimensional, and her choice of an information
system on the first dimension is potentially informative about the second dimension. All these
papers parameterize the set of feasible information systems along one dimension, and also make
the signaling action of the sender one-dimensional. By contrast, this paper shows how to handle
a much richer set of feasible information systems, and by the same token a much richer set of
signaling actions.
2 The Model
The Players. A sender of type t ∈ {L,H} seeks validation from a receiver. The receiver
favors validation if and only if t = H. The prior is that type H occurs with probability
p ∈ (0, 1). The gain from validation is set 1 for both types of the sender. I normalize the
payoff of the receiver to be 0 when she makes the right decision, while undue validation entails
a loss ωv > 0, and undue rejection a loss ωr > 0. If (1 − p)ωv < pωr, the receiver is (ex ante)
pro-validation and incentives are (ex ante) aligned, and if (1 − p)ωv > pωr, she is (ex ante)
pro-rejection and there is a conflict of interests.
Strategies and Information. The sender can selectively reveal information to the receiver.
She does so by choosing an information system, which consists of a pair of distribution measures
2See also Gill and Sgroi (2008).
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piL(·) and piH(·) on R.3 This choice may be constrained, so I denote by S the set of feasible
information systems. For example, in the usual persuasion framework a` la Milgrom (1981), the
players either reveal their type or reveal nothing, so S can be described as a pair of information
systems (piL, piH) and (p˜iL, p˜iH) supported on {0, 1} with piL(0) = piH(1) = 1, and p˜iL(0) = p˜iH(0).4
In the Bayesian persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), all information systems
are available.5 Let S¯ denote the corresponding feasible set. I say that an information system pi
is fully revealing whenever piL and piH have disjoint support. When piL and piH have overlapping
but unequal supports, pi is partially revealing.
I consider only pure strategies on the sender’s side but I allow the receiver to mix. For an
information system pi, I let Σpi be the reunion of the supports of piL and piH . The receiver uses
a behavioral validation strategy which is a measurable function λ : Σpi → [0, 1], and I denote
by Λpi the set of such functions.
Timing. I use the interim timing in which nature first draws the type of the sender which
she observes, second the sender chooses a feasible information system which is observed by
the receiver, third a signal is generated according to the information system and observed by
the players, and finally the receiver decides whether to validate. For comparison purposes, I
sometimes refer to the ex ante timing, which is the timing under which the sender chooses an
information system before learning her type.
Equilibrium. I consider perfect Bayesian equilibria. The receiver must update her informa-
tion consistently with equilibrium strategies and with the informational content of the signal
generated by the chosen information system. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium implies that the
signal generated by the information system has a sort of preeminence off the equilibrium path
in the following sense. Suppose for example that an off path information system pi′ is chosen
3This description includes any pair of distributions on a finite set as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
4Note that this model also subsumes cheap talk as I could limit S to any number of uninformative pairs of
distribution.
5In fact they constrain the support of the distributions to be finite but this is without loss of generality as
far as feasible outcomes are concerned. As they show, one could even constrain the support to be of cardinality
2.
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and that it generates a signal that could only have come from one of the two types, say t. Then,
following this signal, the receiver must believe that she is facing type t with probability 1, even
though her belief may have put probability 0 on t after observing the off path choice of pi′. This
treatment is consistent with the way evidence is treated in models with hard information.
3 Analysis
3.1 General Results under the Interim Timing
For the players, the relevant properties of an equilibrium are perfectly described by the prob-
ability of justified rejection ρ and the probability of justified validation ν. Suppose that a
certain information system pi is chosen by the sender, and that the receiver uses the behav-
ioral validation strategy λ ∈ Λpi. Then the outcome is summarized by ν(λ) = ∫ λ(σ)dpiH
and ρ(λ) =
∫ (
1 − λ(σ))dpiL. So for an information system pi, the set of feasible outcomes is
Φpi =
{(
ρ(λ), ν(λ)
)
: λ ∈ Λpi}, which is a compact and convex set. 6
An outcome is possible under belief β of the receiver if it corresponds to a best response of the
receiver so the set of possible outcomes is 7 P(β, pi) = arg max(ρ,ν)∈Φpi νβωv +ρ(1−β)ωr. Then
the set of outcomes that can be attained by the sender if her actions lead to a belief β is described
by P(β,S) = ⋃pi∈S P(β, pi). Clearly, all equilibrium outcomes must lie in ⋃β∈[0,1]P(β,S). But
in fact one can restrain attention to a smaller set.
Proposition 1. All equilibrium outcomes lie in P(p,S).
This is due to the fact that one can restrain attention to pooling equilibria. It is reminiscent
of the inscrutability principle of Myerson (1983) for informed principal problems. When all
information systems are available, the logic is exactly the same, and can be generalized to
other setups: any information revealed in a separating equilibrium can be revealed in a pooling
6It is bounded because it is a subset of [0, 1]2, it is closed because it is the image of the set of measurable
functions Λpi, which is closed under pointwise convergence, by a function which is continuous by the dominated
convergence theorem. Convexity can be proved directly without difficulty.
7This is well defined since Φpi is compact and the objective function is continuous.
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equilibrium. When S is constrained, the result is dependent on the particular incentive structure
of the game I consider, which is such that the low type always wants to imitate the high type
If perfect revelation is available, then perfect Bayesian equilibria have some predictive power.
Indeed, any pooling equilibrium must achieve validation with probability one for the high type,
for otherwise a high type sender would deviate to perfect revelation. Therefore an information
system pi is an equilibrium if and only if it maximizes the utility of the high type under the
constraint that the receiver chooses an optimal validation policy given an initial belief equal
to the prior, and the choice of information system. Let H(p,S) = {(ρ, ν) ∈ P(p,S) : ν ≥
ν ′, ∀(ρ′, ν ′) ∈ P(p,S)} denote the set of high type optimal possible outcomes, which I assume
to be non empty.8
Proposition 2 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibria).
1. If a perfectly revealing information system is available, then the set of equilibrium outcomes
is exactly the set of high type optimal outcomes H(p,S), and hence ν = 1 in any such
outcome.
2. If there exists an outcome (ρˆ, νˆ) ∈ P(p,S) such that ρˆ = 1, and for every ν ′ > νˆ, (1, ν ′) /∈
P(p,S), then the set of equilibrium outcomes is the set of outcomes (ρ, ν) ∈ P(p,S) such
that ν ≥ νˆ.
3. Otherwise, all outcomes in P(p,S) can be supported as an equilibrium.
Hence, the predictive power of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is weak when perfect revelation
is not available. But any feasible information system, and therefore any outcome in P(p,S), can
be supported as a pooling equilibrium when no information system allows the high type to be
proved with positive probability. To support any information system pi, it is then sufficient to let
the receiver attribute any alternative choice pi′ to the low type.9 This lack of predictivepower is
unsatisfying. Furthermore, some of these equilibria seem unreasonable. In this case, equilibrium
8This set may be empty if, for example, P(p,S) is an open set of [0, 1]2. It is closed when S = S¯, and
otherwise it is always possible to ensure that it is closed by making reasonable restrictions on S.
9The intuitive criterion, formalized by Cho and Kreps (1987), does not refine prediction since all information
systems perform equally from the point of view of the sender when the receiver forms the belief that she faces
the high type with probability one.
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refinements seem indispensable. My main result is to show that three different but related belief
based refinements lead to the selection of the high type optimal outcomes H(p,S). All of these
refinements, in spite of their unavoidable limitations, capture the following logic, which seems
convincing for this game. First, a successful deviation from an equilibrium path should be
attributed to {H} or {L,H}. Second, if a deviation is attributed to {H}, then both types will
want to use it, which brings the receiver back to {L,H}. Third, at this stage there are three
possibilities: (i) if attributing the deviation to {L,H} makes it profitable for both L and H,
then {L,H} is a self-signaling set; (ii) if attributing the deviation to {L,H} is only profitable to
{L}, then the receiver should put more weight on L but that makes the deviation unattractive
to any type of the sender; (iii) if attributing the deviation to {L,H} is only profitable to {H},
then the receiver could reasonably believe anything between p and 1, but all these beliefs would
make the deviation attractive to either the high type or both types.
Next, I describe these refinements. To gain space, I define them more formally and prove
the result in the appendix. The first of these refinements, R1, is a variant on the notion of
undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993; Umbhauer, 1994). The concept of undefeated
equilibrium relies on the idea that a deviation of the sender from her equilibrium action pi to an
information system pi′ should be interpreted as an attempt to indicate that she would prefer to
play the equilibrium outcome associated to pi′ in P(p,S). The beliefs of the receiver associated
to such a deviation should therefore anticipate the fact that the sender is of a type that benefits
from the new equilibrium. If they do not, the original equilibrium is said to be defeated by
the new one.10 The second notion, R2, is an adaptation of the notion of core mechanisms of
Myerson (1983) to my framework so as to take into account the fact that the designer chooses
an information system rather than a full mechanism.The third notion, R3 refines the notions
of neologism proofness of Farrell (1993) and of perfect sequential equilibrium of Grossman and
Perry (1986).11 For exposition purposes, suppose as in Farrell (1993) that a deviating player
10Contrary to the original definitions, I do not assume that all types using pi′ in the new equilibrium must
prefer either the new equilibrium (Mailath et al., 1993), or some best response of the receiver to the belief
generated by pi′ in the new equilibrium, to the original equilibrium (Umbhauer, 1994).
11It is easy to show that in this example all the perfect Bayesian equilibria are selected by the notions of
Farrell (1993) and Grossman and Perry (1986).
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is allowed to make a suggestion to the receiver as to how her deviation should be interpreted.
The idea is to use the suggestion to start a chain of subsets of types that could be making the
deviation by asking which types benefits if the receiver best-responds to the suggestion (a set
S1), and then which types benefit if the receiver best-responds to the belief generated by S1
etc.
Proposition 3. All three refinements select exactly the equilibrium outcomes in H(p,S).
In the next section I analyze the consequences of selecting the high type optimal outcomes
under several common restrictions on the set of available information systems. Before doing
that, I remark that the D1 criterion12 of Cho and Kreps (1987) may in some cases lead to a
different selection. In fact, D1 and the NWBR criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) make
the same selection, which is characterized as follows.
Proposition 4. An outcome (ρ, ν) ∈ P(p,S) is selected by D1 or NWBR if and only if either
of the following holds:
(i) ν = 1.
(ii) ρ = 1 and for every ν ′ such that (1, ν ′) ∈ P(p,S), ν ′ ≤ ν.
(iii) For every (ρ′, ν ′) ∈ P(p,S), ρ′ ≤ ρ or ν ′ ≤ ν.
Instead of a complete proof, I provide an example of how D1 operates in the online appendix,
together with a graphic intuition. Applying this intuition repeatedly leads to the result of the
proposition.
4 Applications
First, I consider the case where all information systems are available. It is represented in panels
(a) and (b) of Figure 1 for, respectively, the pro rejection and pro validation cases. The set
P(p, S¯) is the set of policies that lie above the blue dotted line, whose equation is given by
12See also Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Sobel (1990).
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Figure 1: Applications – (a) all information systems available; pro rejection receiver (b) all
information systems available; pro validation receiver (c) information systems: one of the nor-
mal families; pro rejection receiver (d) information systems: one of the normal families; pro
validation receiver.
νpωr + ρ(1 − p)ωv = χ, where the left hand-side is the objective that the receiver tries to
maximize, and the right hand-side is the value of this objective function if she always rejects for
the pro-rejection case and if she always validates for the pro-validation case. By Proposition 2,
the set of equilibrium outcomes is exactly the set of policies such that the high type is validated
with probability 1, which is represented by the green dashed line in both panels. To the left
of this line, KG denotes the ex ante (Kamenica-Gentzkow) solution. To the right, Rev is
the receiver-optimal policy, which can only be attained under full revelation. By refining the
solution concept even more, it may be possible to select either of these outcomes in the interim
case. If one requires the selected outcome to be Pareto optimal across types, for example,
then the ex ante outcome is the unique selection. To select the full revelation outcome, one can
modify the preferences of the sender as follows. Suppose that the sender cares lexicographically:
first, about the probability of validation; second about the belief of the receiver. The prediction
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under the ex ante timing remains the same as before. Under the interim timing, however, the
unique high type optimal outcome now corresponds to full revelation.
Second, I consider information systems such that piH is a normal distribution with mean
` > 0 and variance V , while piL is a normal distribution with mean −` and variance V . Then,
there are two natural ways of generating a family of feasible information systems: first, by
considering variances from V = 0 to ∞, and adding a completely uninformative information
system; second by letting ` go from 0 to ∞, and adding a perfectly revealing information
system. In the discussion that follows, both families are denoted by SN as they have the same
qualitative properties. Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 1 illustrate the properties of these families
for, respectively, the pro rejection and the pro validation cases. The red curve represents the set
P(p,SN ) of feasible outcomes, and H(p,SN ) corresponds to the green dots. In the pro rejection
case, full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome, whereas in the pro validation case,
both the full revelation outcome and the completely uninformative outcome leading to certain
validation are possible. Under the ex ante timing, the unique prediction would lie somewhere
on the upper half of the red curve for the pro rejection case, and at the uninformative outcome
for the pro validation case.
In the pro-validation case, it is interesting to constrain the precision of available information
systems (taken to be ` or the inverse V ) to a limited range. Then, the set P(p,S) corresponds
to a connected portion of the U-shaped curve in panel (d). Hence the high type optimal
outcome lies at either extreme point of the curve depending on the range of precisions. This
means that a small technical change leading to the availability of slightly more precise tests,
or a strengthening of regulation imposing a higher minimal precision, could lead to a dramatic
change of outcome from the least informative test to the most informative test.
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Appendix
A Three Refinements and a Proof
In this section I define the refinements for general sender-receiver games. The type set is denoted
by T , p(·) denotes the prior belief, and for any set S ⊆ T , p(·|S) denotes the restriction of the
prior to S. Then I prove Proposition 3.
R1. The idea of this family of refinements is that an out-of-equilibrium action should be
interpreted as an attempt by a player to signal that she would prefer to coordinate on another
equilibrium in which this action is played. If the beliefs of the players in the original equilibrium
do not anticipate this, the original equilibrium should be discarded. This idea was developed
independently in Mailath et al. (1993) and Umbhauer (1994) with small differences. Formally,
in a sender-receiver game with general action set for the sender, if T is the type set of the
sender and e is the original equilibrium, consider an equilibrium e′ and an action of the sender
a′ which is on the equilibrium path of e′ but off the equilibrium path of e′. Then let T+ ⊆ T
be the set of types that strictly prefer e′ to e and use action a′ in e′, and T 0 ⊆ T be the set
of types who are indifferent between e and e′ and use a′ in e′. Then the belief of the receiver
that follows the use of a′ in the initial equilibrium e should be in the convex hull of p(.|T+) and
p(.|T+ ∪ T 0). This means that the receiver should believe that all types in T+ send a′ while
types in T 0 may send a′ with positive probability. If this does not hold, then e is defeated by e′.
The refinement retains only undefeated equilibria. Unlike Mailath et al. (1993) or Umbhauer
(1994), I do not require all types who use a′ in e′ to prefer e′ to e, or even some best response
of the receiver to her belief in following a′ in e′.
This refinement raises an issue absent under the original definitions. In the model of this
paper, a deviation to an information system used in a pooling equilibrium that only the high
type prefers is attributed to the high type. The problem is that such an attribution would make
the low type want to use this deviation as well. It does not seem to be particularly problematic
in this game because, if the receiver were to attribute this deviation to both types equally, then
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the high type (and only the high type) would still find the deviation profitable. But the logic
of this attribution may seem unsatisfying (note however that this problems is absent in any
equilibrium satisfying the refinement). The next two refinements tackle this issue.
R2. This refinement is inspired from Myerson (1983). The difference is that the sender an-
nounces an information structure instead of a mechanism. When the sender announces a mech-
anism, his announcement includes the suggestion of a course of action for the receiver, and it
is natural to restrict potentially destabilizing mechanisms to be incentive compatible given the
beliefs they may generate. When the sender merely announces an information structure, the
receiver should best respond given her beliefs, but that does not entail any natural restriction
on the announcements of the sender. In order to define core outcomes, I consider a sender-
receiver game, with general finite type set T for the sender, and where the sender announces an
information system pi (defined for the general type set T ). Then an information system pi is a
core information system if it is an equilibrium and there is no other information system pi′ 6= pi
and set S ⊆ T , such that for every belief p(·|S ′) of the receiver, where S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ T , any type
t ∈ S strictly prefers the outcome obtained when the receiver best responds to pi′ to the initial
equilibrium outcome. The motivation is as follows. Suppose that pi is not a core information
system. Then there exists a subset of types S that would benefit from any beliefs that restricts
the prior to any superset of S. Then any type in S could credibly announce pi′, and tell the
receiver “my type is in S.” The receiver does not have to believe that the sender is indeed in
S, but she should account for the fact that all types in S are strictly better off as long as she
believes that they make this statement.
This refinement tackles the logical difficulty with R1 since a deviation must be profitable
to those who initiate it if it is correctly attributed to them, but also if it is attributed to any
larger set of types, thus anticipating the fact that some types may try to pool on the deviation.
R3. As in the former paragraph. I describe the refinement for a sender-receiver game with
general type set T , and where the sender announces an information system pi. As in Farrell
(1993), I assume that statements of the kind “my type is in S” are available for every S ⊆ T .
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Consider an equilibrium e and an information system pi′ which is never played in e. When
deviating to pi′, the sender can also announce that her type belongs to some set S0 ⊆ T .
Then let S1 be the set of types that strictly benefit from the best response of the receiver to
pi′ under the belief p(·|S0) relative to the initial equilibrium, and so on, so that Sk+1 is the
set of types that strictly benefit from the best response of the receiver to pi′ under the belief
p(·|Sk) relative to the initial equilibrium. The sequence stops if the empty set is ever reached.
The types in
⋃
k Sk are those who could be tempted to use the deviation pi
′ together with the
announcement “my type is in S0.” Therefore the initial equilibrium is deemed unreasonable if
it can only be supported by a belief q ∈ ∆(T ) that does not lie in the convex hull of the set{
p(·|S1), p(·|S2), p(·|S3), · · ·
}
. If the sequence is empty (S1 = ∅), then all beliefs are allowed.
Note the difference with Farrell (1993), which would require the existence of a set S0 such that
S1 = S0 (in Farrell (1993), the deviation is the announcement itself, whereas here it consists in
a choice of a different information system accompanied with the announcement).
This refinement tackles the logical difficulty with R1 since a deviation must be profitable to
those who initiate it if it is correctly attributed to them, but also if it is attributed to a larger
set of types that may pool on the deviation. The difference with R2 is that R3 is more selective
about assessing the types that would pool on the deviation.
Proof of Proposition 3. First consider R1. Let (pi,Σ) be an information system such that
the associated equilibrium outcome in P(p,S) is not in H(p,S) (so full revelation must not be
available).Then consider any information system pi′ 6= pi such that the associated equilibrium
outcome is in H(p,S). Then the high type must prefer the new outcome to the original.
Suppose first that the low type prefers the original equilibrium outcome. Then after observing
the deviation pi′, the receiver who, according to R1, is assumed to interpret it as an attempt to
coordinate on the new equilibrium must believe that this message comes from the high type.
If she did, however, the original equilibrium would not be an equilibrium as both types would
benefit by deviating to pi′. Suppose now that the low type is weakly prefers the new equilibrium.
Then after observing the deviation pi′, the receiver must believe that she faces the high type
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with probability p′ ≥ p. However the original equilibrium cannot be supported by such a belief,
since by deviating to pi′ the high type would get both a more favorable belief p′ and a more
favorable information system. This shows that all selected equilibrium outcomes lie in H(p,S).
To show that the two sets are in fact equal, consider an information system pi that leads to
an equilibrium outcome in H(p,S). Since the high type cannot improve her situation, the
refinement does not prevent from believing that any deviation is originated by the low type,
and such beliefs clearly support the equilibrium.
Now consider R2. Let pi be an information system such that the associated equilibrium
outcome in P(p,S) is not inH(p,S). Consider another information system pi′ with an associated
equilibrium outcome in H(p,S). Then let S = {H}. Clearly the high type prefers the outcome
associated to the information system pi′ and the belief p(·|S) since the latter must put probability
one on the high type. Now consider S ′ = {H,L}. Then p(·|S ′) is simply the prior, and since pi′
is in H(p,S), the best response to pi′ when the belief is the prior leads to a better outcome than
the equilibrium associated with pi. Therefore the initial equilibrium is not a core equilibrium.
This proves that all core equilibrium outcomes lie in H(p,S). Now consider an information
system pi such that the associated equilibrium outcome lies in H(p,S). It can be supported by
the belief that any other choice is due to the low type. Suppose that this equilibrium is not
a core equilibrium. Then the high type would have to strictly prefer the outcome associated
with a different information system pi′ under the belief p(.|T ), which is simply the prior. But
then that would contradict the fact that pi together with the prior leads to a high type optimal
outcome.
Now consider R3. Let pi be an information system such that the associated equilibrium
outcome in P(p,S) is not in H(p,S). Consider another information system pi′ with an asso-
ciated equilibrium outcome in H(p,S). Suppose that the receiver deviates from the original
equilibrium by choosing pi′ and at the same time suggests to the receiver that she is the high
type, so S0 = {H}. The receiver must realize that both types would benefit if she were to
believe the suggestion, so S1 = {H,L}, and the corresponding belief is exactly the prior. If
that is indeed the receiver’s belief, she will reproduce the outcome associated with pi′. This
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outcome makes the high type strictly better of. There are two cases. First, if it is does not
make the low type strictly better of, then S2 = {H}, and the sequence generated is therefore
Sk = {H} for every even k, and Sk = {L,H} for every odd k. Second, if both types are better
of under the outcome obtained when the receiver best responds to pi′ with a belief equal to the
prior. Then S2 = S1 = {L,H}, and that pins down the sequence Sk = {L,H} for every k ≥ 1.
In both cases, the possible beliefs that support the initial equilibrium following a deviation to
pi′ must lie in [p, 1], but that clearly makes this deviation profitable for the high type, so the
initial equilibrium cannot satisfy the refinement. Note that we could have used the suggestion
S0 = {L,H} to get the same result. This proves that all equilibrium outcomes that satisfy
R3 lie in H(p,S). Now consider an information system pi such that the associated equilibrium
outcome lies in H(p,S). Consider any deviation pi′. If the suggestion of the receiver is {L}, then
S1 = ∅ and the belief that puts all the weight on the low type is allowed following this deviation
and it supports the original equilibrium. If the suggestion is {L,H}, then the associated belief
is the prior, but since the original equilibrium is high type optimal, the set S1 is either {L} or
the empty set. If S1 = L, then S2 = ∅. In both cases, the belief that puts all the weight on
the low type is allowed and supports the original equilibrium. Finally, suppose the suggestion
of the receiver is S0 = {H}. Then S1 = {L,H}, and S2 is either {L} or the empty set. So the
prior is a possible belief in both cases, and it supports the original equilibrium.
B Remaining Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists a fully separating equilibrium in which
the low type plays pi and the high type plays pi′ 6= pi. Then the high type is validated with
probability 1 and the low type with probability 0. If the low type deviates to pi′, she is validated
with probability 1 unless pi′ is fully revealing. So for this to be a separating equilibrium, pi′
must be fully revealing. But then the same outcome is obtained in a pooling equilibrium in
which both types choose pi′, which can be supported by believing that any deviation can only
be initiated by the low type.
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Proof of Proposition 2. If perfect revelation is available, the high type can ensure validation
with probability 1 by deviating to full revelation, hence any equilibrium must satisfy ν = 1.
Any outcome in P(p,S) such that ν = 1 can clearly be supported as an equilibrium which
concludes the proof of 1.
Let (1, νˆ) be as in the proposition. If νˆ = 1, full revelation must be available and we are
back to 1, so suppose νˆ < 1. I look for information systems that can generate the outcome
(1, νˆ). The only way for the low type to be rejected with probability 1 while the high type
is validated with positive probability is if the information system partially separates the two
types: there must exist some signal realizations that only the high type can send, and following
which the receiver validates, and some signal realizations that can be sent by both types or
only the low type and following which the receiver rejects with probability 1. Furthermore, the
probability that a signal that can be generated only by the high type occurs must be exactly
νˆ. Hence there must exist an information system that proves the high type with probability
νˆ. But then the high type can always ensure a validation probability of νˆ by deviating to this
information system, so any perfect Bayesian equilibrium must give her a validation probability
of at least νˆ. Now it must also be the case that no deviation can give the high type a validation
probability ν > νˆ for that would mean that (1, ν) ∈ P(p,S), a contradiction. Clearly, then,
every outcome in (ρ), ν) ∈ P(p,S) can be supported as a pooling equilibrium.
To prove the last point, note by 1. and 2. that there cannot exist any information system
such that the high type can prove her type with positive probability. Therefore any outcome
in P(p,S) can be supported as an equilibrium if the receiver believes that any deviation comes
from the low type exclusively.
C D1: An Example
In this example the sender only has two information systems pi1 and pi2 available, and the sets
of possible outcomes generated by these information systems under all beliefs, ∪β∈[0,1]P(β, pi1)
and ∪β∈[0,1]P(β, pi2), are represented respectively by the lower and the upper curve on Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Example – The high type optimal equilibrium is e1, but the only equilibrium that
satisfies D1 is e2. (a) shows why e1 cannot satisfy D1, while (b) shows why e2 satisfies D1.
The receiver is pro validation, and her indifference sets over outcomes are represented by the
dashed red lines. So the two possible equilibria are e1 and e2. Consider e1 and a deviation
in which the sender announces pi2 instead of pi1. The best responses of the receiver that are
preferred by the high type given this deviation correspond to the outcomes that lie on the
portion of the higher curve that is above the horizontal blue line that goes through e1 in panel
(a), while those that are preferred by the low type are the ones that lie on the portion of the
higher curve that is to the left of the vertical blue line. Clearly, according to D1, the receiver
should attribute the deviation to the high type, but e1 cannot be supported if that is the case.
Now consider e2 and a deviation in which the sender announces pi1. The best responses of the
receiver that are preferred by the high type given this deviation are the ones that lie on the
portion of the lower curve that is above the horizontal blue line in panel (b), while those that
are preferred by the low type are the ones that lie on the portion of the lower curve that is to
the left of the vertical blue line. According to D1, the receiver should attribute the deviation to
the low type, and since this belief is compatible e2, this equilibrium passed the test. However
it is easy to see that e1 is the unique high type optimal equilibrium.
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